Any current or future suspension of an application based on the scandalousness provision of Section 2(a) will remain in place until either: (a) the time for filing a petition for certiorari in Brunetti (including any extensions granted) expires, with no petition being filed; or (b) if a petition for certiorari is filed, the later of (1) denial of certiorari or (2) termination of U.S. Supreme Court proceedings in the case. Thereafter, the USPTO will determine whether additional suspension or procedural guidance is needed. If not, examining attorneys will take appropriate action in each case and proceed accordingly.
Applicant’s evidence does not establish that the alternate geographic meaning would be understood by the relevant purchasing public. Rather, given the large number of Spanish speakers in the United States and the fact that consumers who know of the Gaviota region also might know that it derives its name from the Spanish word for “seagull,” we find it likely that these Spanish speakers would “stop and translate” GAVIOTA into its English equivalent, SEAGULL.
to the extent that Applicant’s “coffee for use in single-serve brewing machines” contains energy-boosting ingredients, each term constituting Applicant’s mark is descriptive and retains its descriptive significance in combination. NRG COFFEE, considered as a whole, thus forms a composite that is itself merely descriptive of coffee with energy-boosting ingredients.
This record may indicate some degree of suggestiveness of CHERRY ON TOP, but is insufficient to show that the cited mark is weak. Regardless, even suggestive marks are entitled to appropriate protection against the registration of confusingly similar marks.
The dosing and dispensing caps are an integral component of the bottles in which the beverages are sold, and as Applicant has confirmed, the caps are not sold separately. In other words, consumers are purchasing Applicant's beverages, not the dispensing and dosing caps.
Section 2(d) “does not speak of ‘continuous use,’ but rather of whether the mark or trade name has been ‘previously used in the United States by another and not abandoned.’” West Fla. Seafood, 31 USPQ2d at 1665. *** Although the record as a whole suggests sporadic past use of the KEMI OYL mark, Petitioner is only required to show “proprietary rights in its pleaded common-law mark that precede [Respondent’s] actual or constructive use of its involved mark,” Exec. Coach Builders, 123 USPQ2d at 1180, which rights were not thereafter abandoned. West Fla. Seafood, 31 USPQ2d at 1665.
In the absence of evidence of Petitioner’s actual knowledge of Respondent’s actual use of his mark prior to the close of the opposition period, the June 3, 2014 date of registration is the operative date for laches. Ava Ruha Corp., 113 USPQ2d at 1580.
In In re Cordua, we found that the term “churrasco” was generic, even for use in connection with a broad class of restaurant services, because the key public would understand the term to be referring to a specialty dish—a sub-aspect of restaurant services. Id. at 604. We made clear that “[t]here is no logical reason to treat differently a term that is generic of a category or class of products where some but not all of the goods identified in an application fall within that category.” Id. at 605 (quoting In re Analog Devices, Inc., 1988 WL 252496, at *3 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 21, 1988)). We pointed out, for instance, that the term “pizzeria” would be generic for restaurant services, even though the public does not understand the term to refer to the broad class of restaurants as a whole; the public need only understand that the term refers to “a particular sub-group or type of restaurant rather than to all restaurants.” Id.
In accordance with our decision in Mueller Sports Medicine, we will no longer consider Internet evidence filed by an applicant in an ex parte proceeding to be properly of record unless the URL and access or print date has been identified, either directly on the webpage itself, or by providing this information in a response, except where the examining attorney does not object.
Viewing the marks in their entireties with the non-dominant features appropriately discounted, we find the Cited Mark and the mark FOUNDIT THEFT RECOVERY are similar in meaning and sound and that the similarities in the marks outweigh any dissimilarities. Similarity as to one element (e.g., sight, sound, or meaning) has been held sufficient to support a finding of confusing similarity. Interstate Brands Corp. v. McKee Foods Corp., 53 USPQ2d 1910, 1914 (TTAB 2000) (“It is not necessary that marks be similar in all three of the elements of sight, sound, and meaning to support a finding of likelihood of confusion.”).
Who Owns You After You Die - Inside the Estates of Deceased Celebrities
Friday, July 27, 10:15 a.m. - 11:15 a.m.
This seminar will be moderated by Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, professional basketball legend, author, and registered trademark owner, and his business manager, Deborah Morales. Panelists will include Jennifer E. Rothman, a leading expert on right of publicity and Professor of Law at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles and Priya P. Royal, managing attorney and founder of the Royal Law Firm, PLLC.
Friday, July 27, 11:15 a.m. - 12:15 p.m.
This seminar will be delivered by William R. Covey, United States Patent and Trademark Office Deputy General Counsel and Director of the Office of Enrollment and Discipline (OED). OED is responsible for registering attorneys and agents to practice before the USPTO and the presentation will cover a variety of issues, including OED rules, programs and statistics, as well as related case law.
Opposer’s mark simply conjures a feeling of nostalgia for “pirates” or “piracy,” and this is certainly enhanced in the context of the goods, inasmuch as there is a strong association between rum and pirates. Applicant’s mark, PIRATE PISS, on the other hand, conjures the vulgar image of urine from a pirate. In the context of Applicant’s beer, and for better or worse, the mark will likely be understood as a humorous, self-deprecating description of a quality or strength of the beer or simply just as an arbitrary vulgar expression. Nevertheless, the strong image and commercial impression of Applicant’s mark, PIRATE PISS, distinguishes it from Opposer’s PYRAT mark.
In sum, Applicant’s proposed mark immediately conveys, without need for conjecture or speculation, a feature of Applicant’s services, namely that the subject matter of the photographs displayed on Applicant’s website is light meals and snacks available in Houston, Texas.
Nevertheless, in determining the degree of weakness, if any, in the shared terms, we must “adequately account for the apparent force of [third-party use and registration] evidence,” regardless of whether “specifics” pertaining to the extent and impact of such use have been proven. Juice Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1671, 1674-5 (Fed. Cir. 2015). “[E]xtensive evidence of third-party use and registrations is ‘powerful on its face,’ even where the specific extent and impact of the usage has not been established.” Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur Draussen GmbH & Co. KGAA v. New Millennium Sports, S.L.U., 797 F.3d 1363, 116 USPQ2d 1129, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 982 (2016) (citing Juice Generation v. GS Enters., 115 USPQ2d at 1674).
[A]lthough the Examining Attorney’s evidence did properly include a URL and date, due to Applicant’s objections that certain sites are not active, we find that such evidence is not probative.
Consistent with longstanding practice, we accord these declarations such probative value as they may have, and weigh them with the totality of the evidence.
While we expect most pet owners to cherish their pets, we do not expect that they consider it be reasonable to spend over one hundred times the cost of comparable pet food on a single meal for these treasured creatures.
Read comments and post your comment here.Electric eels I might add do it(Cole Porter, "Let's Do It.")
Though it shocks em I know
Why ask if shad do it, waiter bring me
If the applicant, during the prosecution of the application, provided a listing of third-party registrations, without also submitting actual copies of the registrations, and the examining attorney did not object or otherwise advise the applicant that a listing is insufficient to make such registrations of record at a point when the applicant could cure the insufficiency, the examining attorney will be deemed to have waived any objection to the admissibility of the list. Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Manual of Procedure (“TBMP”) § 1207.03 (June 2017); see also TBMP § 1208.02.
Similar to the submission of third-party registrations, Examining Attorneys have a responsibility to make sure that applicants properly submit Internet evidence. If the applicant’s response includes Internet evidence without a URL or date it was printed, the examining attorney must object to the evidence in the first Office action following the response and advise the applicant as to the proper way to make the Internet evidence of record. Otherwise the Board may consider the objection to be waived.
We have considered the entire record and, to be clear, our determination regarding the relatedness of the involved goods is not based upon who has submitted the most third-party registrations or examples of use to support their arguments. Rather, our determination is based on finding that the respective goods are "related in some manner and/or the circumstances surrounding their marketing [be] such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the respective goods] emanate from the same source."